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EAJA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT
REQUIREMENT AS APPLIED TO SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY CASES
INTRODUCTION
In 1980 Congress passed the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA").1
EAJA allows a private party to recover attorney's fees and costs2 from
the United States if the party prevails3 in a civil action against the United
States unless the court finds that the government's position in the action4
was substantially justified.5 EAJA requires that a prevailing party file his
petition for attorney's fees with the court within thirty days of "final
judgment in the action."6
Since its enactment, several key terms of EAJA have been the subject
of both litigation and commentary.' Although it has engendered tremen-
dous confusion, the term "final judgment" 8 has received little attention in
legal literature and is only recently receiving attention in the courts.
This Note examines the final judgment requirement of EAJA and its
application to Social Security disability cases. There is substantial disa-
greement as to what constitutes the requisite final judgment in Social
Security disability cases that, after being appealed to a district court, are
remanded to the Social Security Administration where a new disability
determination is made.' Part I of this Note discusses the history of
EAJA and the final judgment requirement. Part II examines the Social
1. See Pub. L. No. 96481, §§ 201-208, 94 Stat. 2321, 2325-30 (1980) (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 504 (1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982)).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
7. See, ag., Edwards v. McMahon, 834 F.2d 796, 802 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing
various interpretations among circuit courts as to meaning of "substantial justification");
Brown v. Secretary of Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 747 F.2d 878, 882-83 (3d Cir.
1984) (discussing interpretations among circuits as to meaning of "prevailing party");
Hill, An Analysis and Explanation of the Equal Access to Justice Act, 19 Ariz. St. L.J. 229,
241-43 (1987) (discussing "substantial justification"); Wheeler & Lavan, The Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act: The "American Rule" Revisited, 15 Pub. Cont. L.J. 60, 64-68 (1984)
(discussing terms "prevailing party," "position of the United States," and "substantially
justified"); Note, Institutionalizing an Experiment: The Extension of the Equal Access to
Justice Act-Questions Resolved, Questions Remaining, 14 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 925, 930-35
(1987) (discussing court's construction of "prevailing party" and "position of the United
States").
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1982 & Supp.'V 1987).
9. Compare Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 106 (4th Cir. 1983) (final judgment
where case remanded is court order affirming, reversing or modifying new decision on
remand) with Melkonyan v. Heckler, 878 F.2d 1183, 1186 (9th Cir. 1989) (final judgment
where case remanded is administrative determination concerning amount of benefits due
claimant) (on file at Fordham Law Review), withdrawn, 895 F.2d 556 (1990) and
Melkonyan v. Heckler, 895 F.2d 556, 559 (9th Cir. 1990) (final judgment where case
remanded is Secretary's new decision on remand).
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Security disability program and its interaction with EAJA. Part III dis-
cusses and analyzes the various applications of the final judgment re-
quirement to disability cases. This Note concludes that the approach
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Melkonyan v. Heckler,1° which considers
a final non-appealable administrative decision made on remand to be a
final judgment, should be adopted and applied throughout the circuits.
I. THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT AND THE FINAL
JUDGMENT REQUIREMENT
Recognizing that the expense of hiring an attorney deters individuals
from engaging in litigation against the government,11 Congress passed
EAJA. 12 The primary purpose of EAJA is "to ensure that certain indi-
viduals .. .will not be deterred from seeking review of, or defending
against, unjustified governmental action because of the expense involved
in securing the vindication of their rights." 3 Congress recognized that
citizens' access to justice would improve if parties who prevail in litiga-
tion against the government could recover the reasonable expenses of the
litigation.4
Broken down into its components, EAJA 5 permits a federal court to
10. 895 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1990).
11. See H.R. Rep. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 4984, 4991 [hereinafter House Report I].
12. Pub. L. No. 96-481, §§ 201-08, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504
(1982); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982)).
Congress originally promulgated EAJA in 1980 with an October 1, 1981 effective date.
The Act, however, contained a "sunset" provision providing for automatic repeal on Oc-
tober 1, 1984, three years after implementation. Whether this provision automatically
repealed EAJA is a topic of debate. Compare Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 773 (11th
Cir. 1988) (suggesting repealed and later reenacted), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 862 (1990)
and Garcia v. Schweiker, 829 F.2d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1987) (same) and Note, Determining
Fees for Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act: Accomplishing the Act's Goals, 9
Cardozo L. Rev. 1091, 1091 n. 2 (1988) (same) with United States v. 6.93 Acres of Land,
852 F.2d 633, 634-36 (1st Cir. 1988) (suggesting amended) and Hill, supra note 7, at 229
n.3 (same). This debate is irrelevant here, because this Note is concerned with the pres-
ent version of EAJA as it was "reenacted" or "amended" in 1985.
13. H.R. Rep. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 4, reprinted in 1985 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 132, 132-33 [hereinafter House Report 1I].
14: See id. at 136. "Providing an award of fees to a prevailing party represents one
way to improve citizen access to courts .... When there is an opportunity to recover
costs, a party does not have to choose between acquiescing to an unreasonable Govern-
ment order or prevailing to his financial detriment." House Report I, supra note 11, at
4991; see also Ewing v. Rodgers, 826 F.2d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1987) ("EAJA... was
designed primarily to provide financial incentives for contesting unreasonable govern-
mental action"); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 678 F. Supp. 1456, 1458 (E.D. Cal. 1988) (purpose
of EAJA is "to reduce the chance that the expense of litigation would deter an aggrieved
party from asserting his or her rights against the government").
15. The Act provides, in relevant part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a
prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses... in-
curred by that party in any civil action .... including proceedings for judicial
review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court
1270 [Vol. 58
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(1) award "fees and other expenses" 16 to (2) a "prevailing party"17 in a
civil action unless the court finds that (3) the "position of the United
States"" was (4) "substantially justified", 19 and provided that (5) the ap-
having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the
United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
16. Id. Included in the "fees and other expenses" that may be awarded are "the
reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engi-
neering report, test, or project which is found by the court to be necessary for the prepa-
ration of the party's case, and reasonable attorney fees." Id. § 2412(d)(2)(A). EAJA
requires that the amount of fees awarded be based upon prevailing market rates for the
particular services furnished. See id. In addition, the Act provides that "attorney fees
shall not be awarded in excess of $75 per hour unless the court determines that an in-
crease in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified
attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee." Id. § 2412 (d)(2)(A)(ii).
Fee awards in excess of $75 per hour are not uncommon. See, e.g., Bowker v. Bowen,
706 F. Supp. 88, 90 (D. Me. 1989) (awarded $110 per hour); Farmers Coop. Dairy, Inc.
v. Block, 703 F. Supp. 379, 382 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (awarded $90 per hour); Wilson v.
Bowen, 691 F. Supp. 1257, 1262 (D. Ariz. 1988) (awarded $125 per hour); Tepper v.
Bowen, 687 F. Supp. 428, 431 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (awarded $125 per hour); Perez v. Secre-
tary of Health & Hum. Servs., 675 F. Supp. 93, 94 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (awarded $90 per
hour). According to one court, the ability of a district court to award a fee in excess of
the $75 per hour cap under an inflation rationale provides a disincentive for agencies to
prolong litigation. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700,
713 (3d Cir. 1983).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). To be eligible for a fee award
under EAJA, the party seeking the award must have prevailed against the United States.
See id. The legislative history sheds little light upon the meaning of the term "prevailing
party." See House Report I, supra note 11, at 4990-9 1. In particular, the legislative his-
tory states that:
the phrase "prevailing party" should not be limited to a victor only after entry
of a final judgment following a full trial on the merits. A party may be deemed
prevailing if he obtains a favorable settlement of his case; if the plaintiff has
sought voluntary dismissal of a groundless complaint; or even if he does not
ultimately prevail on all issues.
Id. (citations omitted). The Supreme Court, however, has recently ruled on the issue. In
Sullivan v. Hudson, 109 S. Ct. 2248 (1989), the Court stated "in order to be considered a
prevailing party, a plaintiff must achieve some of the benefit sought in bringing the ac-
tion." Id. at 2255.
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1)(A), 2412(d)(2)(D) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Once it is
established that a claimant is a prevailing party, the United States is liable for fee awards
unless the court finds that the "position of the United States" was substantially justified.
Id. Prior to the 1985 amendment of EAJA, courts disagreed as to whether "position"
referred solely to the government's litigation position, see Blitz v. Donovan, 740 F.2d
1241, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1984); White v. United States, 740 F.2d 836, 842 (1 1th Cir. 1984);
Amidon v. Lehman, 730 F.2d 949, 952 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984);
United States v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef, 726 F.2d 1481, 1487 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 825 (1984), or whether "position" referred both to the litigation and to the
government's action or inaction which led to the underlying conflict. See Miller v.
United States, 753 F.2d 270, 274 (3d Cir. 1985); Iowa Express Distribution, Inc. v.
NLRB, 739 F.2d 1305, 1309 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1088 (1984); Rawlings v.
Heckler, 725 F.2d 1192, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 1984). That is, some courts required only that
the government's litigation position be substantially justified while other courts required
both that the government's litigation position and the government's action or inaction
which led to the underlying conflict be substantially justified. Aware of different interpre-
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plication for fees was submitted within thirty days of "final judgment."20
The 1980 version of EAJA did not contain any explanatory language
regarding the meaning of "final judgment."'" In 1985, Congress added
language to EAJA to clarify the final judgment requirement.22 The Act
now defines final judgment as "a judgment that is final and not appeala-
ble, and includes an order of settlement. '23 Congress added this section
in an effort to resolve disagreement as to whether a decision was consid-
ered final when made, or whether it was not final either until all appellate
proceedings were completed or until the time to appeal expired.24 Con-
tations among the circuits, Congress included clarifying language in the 1985 version of
EAJA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) (Supp. V 1987). This section provides that: "'po-
sition of the United States' means, in addition to the position taken by the United States
in the civil action, the action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is
based." Id. This language clarifies the Congressional intent that "position of the United
States" include not only the government's position in the litigation, but its actions and
omissions forming the basis of the court action. See House Report II, supra note 13, at
139-40. If position means litigation position only, the incentive for careful agency action
would be weakened, because regardless of the agency's conduct, the government could
avoid any fee liability simply by adopting a reasonable position at trial. See id.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The government bears the
burden of proving that its position was substantially justified. See Jackson v. Bowen, 807
F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986); Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984); Sherman v. Bowen, 647 F. Supp. 700, 703 (D. Me.
1986).
Following the inception of the original EAJA, many courts applied a standard of rea-
sonableness to the substantial justification question. See Bazaldua v. INS, 776 F.2d 1266,
1269 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Yoffe, 775 F.2d 447, 450 (1st Cir. 1985); United
States v. Community Bank & Trust Co., 768 F.2d 311, 314 (10th Cir. 1985); Cornella v.
Schweiker, 741 F.2d 170, 171 (8th Cir. 1984). Other courts, however, concluded that
substantial justification required slightly more than reasonable justification. See Massa-
chusetts Fair Share v. Law Enforcement Assistance Admin., 776 F.2d 1066, 1068 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); Phillips v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 870, 872 (W.D.N.C. 1983).
In 1988, in Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988), the Supreme Court concluded
that substantially justified means "justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable
person." Id. at 565. According to the Court, this is the same as the traditional "reason-
able basis both in law and fact." Id. In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected the
following language contained in the 1985 House Committee Report pertaining to the
"reenactment" of EAJA: "[S]everal courts have held correctly that 'substantial justifica-
tion' means more than merely reasonable.... [Tihe test [in determining whether some-
thing is substantially justified] must be more than mere reasonableness." House Report
I, supra note 13, at 138 (footnote omitted). The Court rejected this language in the 1985
legislative history because it was an explanation of a phrase ("substantially justified") that
was not drafted by the 1985 committee: only the legislative history of the Congress that
created the substantial justification standard (the 96th Congress) is relevant. See Pierce,
108 S. Ct. at 566. The Court did, however, follow the legislative history of the 96th
Congress, which states "[t]he test of whether or not a Government action is substantially
justified is essentially one of reasonableness. Where the Government can show that its
case had a reasonable basis both in law and fact, no award will be made." House Report
I, supra note 11, at 4989.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1982).
22. See Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (1985) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G)
(Supp. V 1987)).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(G) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
24. See House Report 1I, supra note 13, at 135.
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gress adopted the latter view that a judgment is final when either all ap-
pellate proceedings are completed or the time to appeal has run.25
While EAJA's legislative history states that the final judgment require-
ment "should not be used as a trap for the unwary resulting in the un-
warranted denial of fees,"26 the final judgment requirement is
jurisdictional.2 7 A litigant's failure to file a timely fee application de-
prives the court of subject matter jurisdiction, and deprives the disabled
individual of his opportunity to obtain much-needed fees. Complying
with the final judgment requirement is thus a crucial step in obtaining
attorney's fees under EAJA.
The interpretational problem posed by the final judgment requirement
lies in identifying the relevant judgment that is final and not appealable.
Neither the Act nor the legislative history explain what constitutes a
"judgment" under EAJA. Some decisions have suggested that a judg-
ment occurs upon final disposition of the case on the merits.28 This inter-
pretation of the term "judgment" implies that where a case is initiated in
an administrative agency, later appealed to a district court, and eventu-
ally decided on remand by the agency, the decision of the agency on the
merits would be the requisite judgment that must be final. Other deci-
sions, however, interpret EAJA to require a formal judicial judgment or
order.29
The question of what constitutes a final judgment under EAJA arises
frequently in Social Security disability cases. When a district court con-
sidering an appeal of a disability case remands the case to the Social Se-
curity Administration for further administrative proceedings and the
Administration, on remand, issues a new decision finding the claimant
disabled, there is confusion as to which decision constitutes a final judg-
ment for EAJA purposes. Resolving this question and adopting a uni-
form final judgment standard in the disability context is important
because EAJA potentially could be employed by tens of thousands of
disabled individuals nationwide.30
25. See id. at 146.
26. Id. at 146 n.26.
27. See United States v. J.H.T. Inc., 872 F.2d 373, 375 (11th Cir. 1989); MacDonald
Miller Co. v. NLRB, 856 F.2d 1423, 1424 (9th Cir. 1988); Long Island Radio Co. v.
NLRB, 841 F.2d 474, 477-78 (2d Cir. 1988); Olson v. Norman, 830 F.2d 811, 821 (8th
Cir. 1987); J.M.T. Mach. Co. v. United States, 826 F.2d 1042, 1046-47 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Clifton v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 1138, 1144-45 (5th Cir. 1985).
28. See Allen v. Secretary of Health & Hum. Servs., 781 F.2d 92, 94 (6th Cir. 1986);
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 580 F. Supp. 436, 438 (D.D.C.), modified,
594 F. Supp. 69 (1984).
29. See Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 106 (4th Cir. 1983); Warner v. Bowen,
648 F. Supp. 1409, 1411 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Alexander v. Heckler, 612 F. Supp. 272, 274
(D.R.I. 1985).
30. From June 1984 to June 1985, 18,747 disability cases were filed in the district
courts throughout the United States. See S. Mezey, No Longer Disabled: The Federal
Courts and the Politics of Social Security Disability 123 (1988).
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II. SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY BENEFITS
The Social Security Act established several programs which provide
financial assistance to individuals.3" This Note will address disability in-
surance and the procedure for handling such claims under the Social Se-
curity Act.32 Created in the mid-1950s,33 the Social Security disability
insurance program provides financial support for members of the labor
force who, due to a disability,34 are totally unable to work.35
A. The Administrative Process
A claimant must fie his application for disability benefits with the So-
cial Security Administration ("SSA"). 36 Once the application is filed, it
is turned over to a state disability determination service for evaluation.
37
An initial determination is made by the state agency, and a written notice
of this determination is mailed to the claimant.38
If the claimant is dissatisfied with the initial determination he may
request a reconsideration.39 The claimant has a statutory right to a re-
consideration as long as he submits his written request for reconsidera-
tion within sixty days of receiving notice of the initial determination.' °
A claimant who is dissatisfied with the reconsidered determination41
31. Programs administered under the Act include: old-age assistance, old age survi-
vors', and disability insurance benefits, maternal, child health and crippled children serv-
ices, and supplemental security income for the aged, blind or disabled. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 301-306, 401-433, 701-716, 1381-1383 (1982).
32. See generally 20 C.F.R. Part 404 (1988).
33. See S. Mezey, supra note 30, at 1.
34. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505 (1988).
35. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1982). To receive benefits, a claimant must have
earned a minimum amount of wages within a specified period preceeding his application
for benefits, and he must be totally disabled. That is, due to a medical or physical impair-
ment he must be unable to perform any meaningful job in the national economy. See S.
Mezey, supra note 30, at 28-29. The program functions as an income maintenance
scheme, attempting to replace all or part of the income lost due to the disability. See id.
at 1.
The amount of benefits awarded is related to the pre-disability income of the claimant.
See R. Francis, Social Security Disability Claims: Practice and Procedure § 1:21, at 22
(1983). In 1985, the United States paid an average of $1,285,386,000.00 a month to
2,656,500 disabled workers. See S. Mezey, supra note 30, at 38. This amount increases
when the benefits awarded to the spouse and children of the disabled worker are consid-
ered. See id; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.330, .350 (1988).
36. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.610(b) (1988). The SSA is that part of the Department of
Health and Human Services which has administrative responsibilities under the Social
Security Act. See id. § 404.110 (1988).
37. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1503 (1988). State agencies generally make the initial disabil-
ity determination for the Department of Health and Human Services. States do, how-
ever, have the option of turning the disability determination function over to the federal
government if they so choose. See id.
38. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.902, 404.904 (1988).
39. See id. §§ 404.907-909 (1988).
40. See id.; H. McCormick, Social Security Claims and Procedure § 538, at 57 (1983).
41. In 1980, 14.7 percent of the claims that were reconsidered were reversed. See S.
Mezey, supra note 30, at 62-63.
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may, within 60 days, request a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge ("ALJ").42 The claimant has a right to an ALJ hearing provided
he fies a written request subsequent to the reconsidered determination. 3
The ALJ acts as both a non-partisan fact-finder" and decision maker.45
It is the AU_'s responsibility to develop the case fully and to make a new
determination as to claimant's disability.46
A claimant who receives an unfavorable decision from the ALJ may
request review by the Appeals Council.47 This is the last level of admin-
istrative review,48 and a claimant must request Appeals Council review
before he can initiate judicial review in a federal court. 9 Unlike the re-
consideration and ALJ hearing, the claimant does not have a right to
Appeals Council review.5 0 After receiving a request for review, the Ap-
peals Council may either dismiss or deny the request,5 ' or grant the re-
quest and make a final determination. 2 If the request is dismissed or
denied, the ALJ decision becomes the final, binding decision of the Secre-
tary of the Department of Health and Human Services and is not subject
to further administrative review." If the Appeals Council grants review,
its decision following review becomes the final and binding decision of
the Secretary. 54
B. The Appellate Process
The final decision of the Secretary is subject to judicial review and may
be appealed to a district court pursuant to section 405(g) of title 42.55 As
42. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.929 (1988).
43. See id. § 404.930 (1988).
44. See R. Francis, supra note 35, § 8:19, at 19-22; H. McCormick, supra note 40, at
75.
45. See D. Keenan & C. Ashman, Social Security Disability Claims: Practice and
Procedure § 3-6, at 78; H. McCormick, supra note 40, at 75.
46. See R. Francis, supra note 35, § 8:19, at 20 n.3. The AI_ is required to make a
full record of the hearing, which is usually taped. See D. Keenan & C. Ashman, supra
note 45, § 3-6, at 78-80. In 1980, ALJs reversed the initial determination of the Adminis-
tration in approximately 59.1 percent of the cases they reviewed. See S. Mezey, supra
note 30, at 62-63. This high reversal rate suggests that braving the administrative appeals
process is beneficial to disabled claimants.
47. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.967 (1988). The Appeals Council was established by the
Secretary to review decisions of the AIJs. See H. McCormick, supra note 40, § 599, at
120. The "Secretary" is the head of the Department of Health and Human Services. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (1988).
48. See D. Keenan & C. Ashman, supra note 45, at 89.
49. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (1988); D. Keenan & C. Ashman, supra note 45, § 3-10,
at 88-89.
50. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967, 404.981 (1988).
51. See id. § 404.967 (1988).
52. See id.
53. See id. § 404.981 (1988).
54. See id.
55. This section provides in part: "Any individual, after any final decision of the
Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in
controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within 60
days after the mailing to him of notice of such decision.... ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982).
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with reconsideration and ALJ review, the claimant has a statutory right
to judicial review.16 The entire administrative process-from filing an
application with the SSA to filing a civil action contesting the Secretary's
final determination in a district court-often takes more than eighteen
months.57
The scope of review by a district court in disability cases is narrow,
and is limited to determining whether the decision of the Secretary is
supported by substantial evidence in the record. 8 After a review of the
record, the judge can (1) affirm the decision of the Secretary; 59 (2) reverse
the decision of the Secretary and remand solely for a calculation of bene-
fits;60 or (3) remand the case back to the Secretary for further administra-
56. See id.
57. See, e.g., Melkonyan v. Heckler, 895 F.2d 556, 556-57 (9th Cir. 1990) (application
filed May 28, 1982; district court action commenced June 8, 1984); Jankovich v. Bowen,
868 F.2d 867, 868 (6th Cir. 1989) (application filed August 22, 1984; Appeals Council
denied review January 18, 1986); Papazian v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1455, 1455 (9th Cir. 1988)
(application filed November 29, 1984; district court action commenced April 7, 1986);
Paige v. Sullivan, 717 F. Supp. 626, 627 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (application filed November
1983; district court action November 1987); Lynn v. Bowen, 702 F. Supp. 768, 770 (W.D.
Mo. 1988) (application fied August 1984; Appeals Council denial November 1985). But
see Lopez v. Sullivan, 882 F.2d 1533, 1534 (10th Cir. 1989) (application filed February
28, 1984; district court action commenced November 13, 1984).
In 1985, 18,747 disability cases were filed in the district courts. See S. Mezey, supra
note 30, at 123.
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982); see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410
(1971) (district court duty is to determine whether Secretary's findings are supported by
substantial evidence).
59. See Kelley v. Sullivan, 890 F.2d 961, 964-65 (7th Cir. 1989); Haywood v. Sulli-
van, 888 F.2d 1463, 1466 (5th Cir. 1989).
When the district court afftrms the Secretary's decision, the claimant is not a "prevail-
ig party" and therefore, EAJA may not be used. See Kemp v. Heckler, 777 F.2d 414,
414 (8th Cir. 1985). It is settled that a claimant becomes a "prevailing party" under
EAJA when it is determined, either by the district court on direct appeal or by the Secre-
tary on remand, that he is disabled and entitled to benefits. See Swedberg v. Bowen, 804
F.2d 432, 434 (8th Cir. 1986); Tressler v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 146, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1985);
McGill v. Secretary of Health & Hum. Servs., 712 F.2d 28, 31-32 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984); Hall v. Bowen, 672 F. Supp. 667, 669-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1987);
Childress v. Heckler, 616 F. Supp. 563, 564-65 (E.D. La. 1985).
60. See Pribek v. Secretary of Health & Hum. Servs., 717 F. Supp. 73, 74 (W.D.N.Y.
1989); Coup v. Heckler, 706 F. Supp. 405, 407 (W.D. Pa. 1989); Carmel v. Bowen, 700 F.
Supp. 794, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
When a district court outright reverses the Secretary's decision and awards benefits to
the claimant, the claimant becomes a prevailing party in a civil action against the govern-
ment. See McGill v. Secretary of Health & Hum. Servs., 712 F.2d 28, 31-32 (2d Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984); see also R. Francis, supra note 35, § 5:29, at 32
("A claimant is clearly a prevailing party when a court finds that the claimant is entitled
to benefits and reverses the Secretary's denial, remanding solely for calculation and pay-
ment of benefits."). The claimant may be able to obtain attorney's fees under EAJA
provided that he submits his application for fees within thirty days of final judgment in
the action. Because the government may appeal an adverse decision by the district court,
final judgment does not occur until the government's time to appeal has expired. EAJA
specifically defines a final judgment as one that is "final and not appealable." Thus the
district court reversal is not final, and EAJA's thirty-day filing period does not begin to
run, until the Secretary's time to appeal the district court's decision has expired. See
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tive proceedings. 61
The question of what constitutes the requisite final judgment becomes
especially difficult when a district court remands the case back to the
Secretary for further administrative proceedings and, on remand, the
Secretary finds the claimant to be disabled. A district court generally
will remand the case back to the Secretary for further proceedings if it
decides that additional proceedings can remedy defects in the record of
original proceedings.6 1 It is generally accepted that the court order re-
manding the claim for further administrative proceedings is not a final
judgment in the action. 3
On remand, the Secretary further develops the record as the court di-
rects and reevaluates claimant's application." It is not uncommon for
House Report II, supra note 13, at 146 n.26; see also Martindale v. Sullivan, 890 F.2d 410,
413 & n.5 (11th Cir. 1989) (time limit for applying for attorney fees terminated thirty
days after time to appeal district court's reversal expired); Taylor v. United States, 749
F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1984) (" 'final judgment' arises and the thirty day cut-off for EAJA
petitions begins when the government's right to appeal the order has lapsed"); Najor v.
Secretary of Health & Hum. Servs., 675 F. Supp. 379, 381 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (district
court judgment reversing and remanding solely for calculation of benefits becomes final
after time to appeal expires); Ellis v. Heckler, 569 F. Supp. 792, 793 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(same). But see Reynolds v. Secretary of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 82-419E (W.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allfeds library, Dist file). In Reynolds, the district court
held that the court's order reversing and remanding solely for calculation of benefits was
a final judgment within the meaning of EAJA, and the thirty-day filing period began to
run as of the date of the court's reversal. See Reynolds, No. 82-419E. This holding,
however, is clearly incorrect. Under EAJA, a judgment is not final unless it is no longer
appealable. Because the district court order reversing the Secretary may be appealed by
the Secretary, it cannot be a final judgment under EAJA until the Secretary's time to
appeal it expires.
61. See Gowen v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 613, 616 (8th Cir. 1988); Miller v. Bowen, 703 F.
Supp. 885, 889-90 (D. Kan. 1988); McBride v. Bowen, 701 F. Supp. 403, 404 (W.D.N.Y.
1988).
62. See, eg., Miller, 703 F. Supp. at 889-90 (remanded to Secretary for further pro-
ceedings since AUJ did not sufficiently develop the record as to residual function capacity
of claimant); McBride, 701 F. Supp. at 404 (remanded for further proceedings because an
expert witness was not produced during initial administrative process); Smith v. Bowen,
687 F. Supp. 902, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (remanded to ALJ because ALl did not suffi-
ciently question claimant, request additional reports from claimant, or obtain complete
records on claimant from treating hospital); Seeger v. Bowen, 679 F. Supp. 817, 817
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (remand required to clarify grounds upon which ALJ based his conclu-
sions as to lack of disability); Rosa v. Bowen, 677 F. Supp. 782, 785 (D.N.J. 1988) (re-
mand required where court found Secretary failed to provide claimant with full and fair
hearing).
63. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Hudson, 109 S. Ct. 2248, 2255 (1989) ("there will often be no
final judgment . . . until the administrative proceedings on remand are complete");
Papazian v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1455, 1456 (9th Cir. 1988) (neither government nor court
consider remand order to be requisite final judgment under EAJA); Skip Kirchdorfer,
Inc. v. United States, 803 F.2d 711, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("[W]here the tribunal on re-
mand must determine a significant part of the case, . . . a request for fees before the
judgment on remand is generally premature. Any other position would result in piece-
meal consideration of fee awards."); Warner v. Bowen, 648 F. Supp. 1409, 1410 (S.D.
Fla. 1986) (order of remand to Secretary is not final judgment necessary to trigger 30-day
filing period for attorney fees).
64. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.983 (1988).
1990] 1277
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
the Secretary, on remand, to find the claimant disabled.6"
Once the Secretary has made a new decision on remand, section 405(g)
of the Social Security Act requires the Secretary to file his new decision
and findings of fact with the district court.66 After finding the claimant
disabled, the Secretary must then compute the amount of monthly bene-
fits to which the claimant is entitled.67
In Guthrie v. Schweiker,68 a claimant appealed his denial of benefits to
the district court, which remanded the case back to the Secretary for
further consideration. On remand, the Secretary issued his final decision
finding claimant disabled and entitled to benefits.69 The Fourth Circuit
held that, after the Secretary makes his decision on remand and files this
decision with the district court pursuant to section 405(g), the district
court must then enter an order either affirming, modifying or reversing
the Secretary's final decision.70 According to the Fourth Circuit, this last
district court order is the final judgment for EAJA purposes.7 1
In a case with similar facts, the Ninth Circuit, in a withdrawn opin-
ion,72 concluded that it was not necessary for the district court to issue
an order subsequent to the Secretary's decision on remand. It held that
the Secretary's decision on remand as to the claiamnt's disability was not
a final judgment under EAJA. Rather, the Secretary's later decision as
to the amount of benefits was the final judgment for EAJA purposes.7 3
The final approach, recently adopted by the Ninth Circuit in substitu-
tion for its withdrawn opinion, is to consider the Secretary's decision on
remand, finding the claimant disabled and entitled to benefits, to be a
final judgment under EAJA.7 4
65. See Sullivan, 109 S. Ct. at 2252; Melkonyan v. Heckler, 895 F.2d 556, 557 (9th
Cir. 1990); Papazian, 856 F.2d at 1455; Gowen v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 613, 614 (8th Cir.
1988); Thompson v. Sullivan, 715 F. Supp. 1019, 1020 (D. Kan. 1989); McBride v.
Bowen, 701 F. Supp. 403, 404 (W.D.N.Y. 1988).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982). The provision states in relevant part: "the Secre-
tary shall, after the case is remanded, ... modify or affirm his findings of fact or his
decision, or both, and shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings
of fact and decision . . . ." Id.
67. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.201 (1988). The calculation of benefits may occur prior to
the Secretary's filing his new decision with the district court, or it may occur after such
filing.
68. 718 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1983).
69. See id. at 105-06.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 106.
72. Melkonyan v. Heckler, 878 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1989) (on file at Fordham Law
Review), withdrawn, 895 F.2d 556 (1990).
73. See id. at 1186.
74. See Melkonyan v. Heckler, 895 F.2d 556, 558-59 (9th Cir. 1990); see also
Wagaman v. Bowen, 698 F. Supp. 187, 189 (D.S.D. 1988) (using same approach).
1278 [Vol. 58
EAJA AND FINAL JUDGMENT
III. INADEQUACY OF FOURTH AND ORIGINAL NINTH CIRCUIT
APPROACHES
A. Fourth Circuit Approach
In Guthrie v. Schweiker," the Fourth Circuit rejected the premise that
the Agency decision on remand could be a final judgment,76 and held
that after the Secretary files his new decision with the district court, the
district court must then enter an order either affirming, reversing or
modifying the Secretary's decision. 7 In rejecting the notion that an
agency decision could act as a final judgment in the action for EAJA
purposes, the Fourth Circuit relied on the contention that EAJA clearly
distinguishes between administrative action and judicial action.78 Conse-
quently, a final judgment in a judicial action is necessary.
The Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Hudson,79 however, recently rejected
this assertion. Sullivan removed, for EAJA purposes, the distinction be-
tween agency action pursuant to remand and judicial action.80 Reaffirm-
ing some of its earlier cases, the Sullivan Court rejected the contention
that "the word 'action' in the fee-shifting provision should be read nar-
rowly to exclude all proceedings which could be plausibly characterized
as 'non-judicial.' "81 The Court noted that "where administrative pro-
ceedings are intimately tied to the resolution of the judicial action...
they should be considered part and parcel of the action .... 82 Accord-
ing to the Court, "[t]his is particularly so in the Social Security context
where [a suit brought in a court of law] remains pending and depends for
its resolution upon the outcome of the administrative proceedings."83
Thus, after the Court's decision in Sullivan, the Fourth Circuit's ration-
ale concerning the non-viability of an agency decision acting as a final
judgment for EAJA purposes is unsound.
In holding that the district court must enter an order following the
Secretary's filing of his new decision with the district court, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the judicial review section of the Social Security
Act 4 requires the Secretary to seek judicial review and affirmance of all
final agency decisions following court-ordered remands8 5 Quoting from
the Social Security Act, the Fourth Circuit stated: "The Secretary must
fie [with the district court] any 'additional and modified findings of fact
and decision, and a transcript of the additional record and testimony
75. 718 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1983).
76. See id. at 106.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. 109 S. Ct. 2248 (1989).
80. See id. at 2255-56.
81. Id. at 2256.
82. Id. at 2255.
83. Id. at 2257.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982).
85. See Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 106 (4th Cir. 1983).
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.... , "86 Adding its own analysis of section 405(g), the Fourth Circuit
stated that "[t]he district court then may enter a judgment affirming,
modifying, or reversing the Secretary's decision.""
While section 405(g) requires the Secretary to file his new decision
with the court following a remand, it does not permit the court to enter a
judgment afflirming, modifying, or reversing the Secretary's decision if
the decision is fully favorable to the claimant.88
Instead, section 405(g) permits the Secretary's new decision to be re-
viewed only to the extent that an original decision of the Secretary may
have been reviewed. Under the Social Security Act, an individual may
seek judicial review of a final decision of the Secretary by bringing an
action in the district court within sixty days of the mailing to him of
notice of such decision.89 Claimants, however, may not seek review of
favorable determinations by the Secretary.90 Thus, section 405(g), which
gives the district courts authority to review decisions of the Secretary,
does not permit a judge to enter a judgment affirming, modifying or re-
versing a decision of the Secretary, made on remand, that is fully
favorable to the claimant. Guthrie's interpretation of section 405(g) is
contrary to the plain language of the statute.
Furthermore, since its enactment in the mid-1950s and prior to the
enactment of EAJA, no other decision has interpreted section 405(g) in
the manner that Guthrie did, and no congressional committee dealing
with an amendment or proposed amendment of section 405(g) has ever
suggested that it should be interpreted in such a manner.9' However, the
legislative committee considering the 1985 amendments to EAJA noted
with approval Guthrie's interpretation of section 405(g), stating that "the
District Court should enter an order affirming, modifying, or reversing
the final HHS decision, and this will usually be the final judgment that
starts the 30 days running." 92 This statement, however, is not an author-
itative interpretation of section 405(g) of the Social Security Act because
"it is the function of the Courts and not the Legislature, much less a
86. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982)).
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982). This section states in relevant part:
[A]nd the Secretary shall, after the case is remanded, and after hearing such
additional evidence if so ordered, modify or affirm his findings of fact or his
decision, or both, and shall file with the court any such additional and modified
findings of fact and decision, and a transcript of the additional record and testi-
mony upon which his action in modifying or affirming was based. Such addi-
tional or modified findings of fact and decision shall be reviewable only to the
extent provided for review of the original findings offact and decision.
Id. (emphasis added).
89. See Gregory v. Bowen, No. 88-1208 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allfeds
library, Dist file); 42 U.S.C § 405(g) (1982).
90. See Jones v. Califano, 576 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1978); Gregory, No. 88-1208.
91. See Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at 5, Melkonyan v. Heckler, 878 F.2d 1183
(9th Cir. 1989) (No. 87-5716) (on file at Fordham Law Review).
92. House Report II, supra note 13, at 148.
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Committee of one House of the Legislature, to say what an enacted stat-
ute means."9 3 The EAJA amendment committee's offhand and periph-
eral comment purporting to interpret the judicial review section of the
Social Security Act (§ 405(g)) is not binding and should be ignored.
The Ninth Circuit also recognized that Guthrie's interpretation of sec-
tion 405(g) is incorrect.94 In Melkonyan v. Heckler,9" the Ninth Circuit
stated, "Guthrie's approach is troublesome. While section 405(g) re-
quires the Secretary to file the new decision and findings after remand, it
does not confer upon the district court any independent power to review
the post-remand filing." 96
Another flaw in the Guthrie holding and rationale is that it allows the
Secretary, by his inaction, to thwart the claimant's ability to receive fees.
If a final judgment may not be obtained until the Secretary fies his new
decision with the court which then issues its final order, the Secretary, by
failing to file his new decision, can prevent a final judgment from being
entered. While section 405(g) requires that the Secretary file his new
decision and findings, it does not specify a period of time in which the
filing must take place.97 The statute merely states that the Secretary
"shall fie with the court any such additional and modified findings of
fact and decision .... ,,gs In fact, it is not uncommon for the Secretary,
in violation of section 405(g), to fail to fie anything with the district
court concerning the outcome of the remand.99
As a result of this filing delay, courts following Guthrie accept fee peti-
tions filed months, sometimes years, after the Secretary has made his fi-
nal decision."° Courts are alerted to these situations when a claimant,
months after the Secretary's decision, files an EAJA petition.101 In such
cases, because no final judgment has been entered, the court dismisses the
EAJA petition without prejudice and orders the Secretary to file the doc-
uments required by § 405(g).' °2 Once the Secretary's documents are
filed, the court will enter its final judgment and then will accept the
93. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 (1988).
94. See Melkonyan v. Heckler, 895 F.2d 556, 559 (9th Cir. 1990).
95. 895 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1990).
96. Id. at 559.
97. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 104, 106 (4th Cir. 1983) ("Despite the
requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Secretary filed nothing with the district court
concerning the outcome of the... remand."); Thompson v. Sullivan, 715 F. Supp. 1019,
1020 (D. Kan. 1989) (Secretary did not file decision on remand with district court until
ordered to do so by district court two years later); Prewentowski v. Sullivan, No. 84-144E
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allfeds library, Dist fie) (no notice fied by
Secretary for 17 months).
100. See Guthrie, 718 F.2d at 106; Thompson, 715 F. Supp. at 1020; Prewentowski, No.
84-144E.
101. See, eg., Guthrie, 718 F.2d at 106 (EAJA petition filed 3 months after Secretary
issued final decision); Prewentowski, No. 84-144E (EAJA petition filed and accepted 17
months after Secretary's remand decision).
102. See Guthrie, 718 F.2d at 106; Prewentowski, No. 84-144E.
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claimant's EAJA petition.10 3
This unnecessary delay is contrary to the purpose of EAJA.1° One of
the primary purposes for providing for attorney's fees was to ensure that
economic considerations would not prompt individuals to allow their
rights to be abused. The Secretary's ability, under Guthrie, to keep a
claimant from obtaining attorney's fees indefinitely is contrary to this
intent.
B. Original Ninth Circuit Approach
Another approach, adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Melkonyan v.
Heckler,0 5 an opinion that was later withdrawn by the court, is to con-
sider the later decision of the Secretary pertaining to the amount of bene-
fits as a judgment for EAJA purposes which becomes final once the time
to appeal expires.' 06 The Ninth Circuit rejected the Secretary's argu-
ment that the new disability determination on remand was a final judg-
ment, reasoning that the Secretary's decision determining that a claimant
is disabled, but failing to calculate the amount of benefits, is not a final
judgment because "a claimant may be recognized as disabled and be
awarded benefits, yet seek.., review of the amount of benefits actually
awarded."107
In their briefs for the rehearing of Melkonyan, both the Secretary and
the claimant took issue with the Ninth Circuit's holding.'x" The Secre-
tary argued that the decision had confused the disability and benefits de-
terminations, treating them as inextricably related. 109 This argument is
persuasive; the Social Security Administration regulations make it clear
that these determinations are two distinct determinations, each subject to
separate administrative and judicial review." 0
In addition, the only issue litigated in a district court action brought
by a claimant after the Secretary denies his disability is the issue of disa-
bility. " ' This issue is resolved when the Secretary, on remand, finds that
103. See Guthrie, 718 F.2d at 106; Prewentowski, No. 84-144E.
104. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
105. 878 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1989) (on file at Fordham Law Review), withdrawn, 895
F.2d 556 (1990).
106. See id. at 1186. Melkonyan had 65 days to appeal the amount of benefits
awarded; once the 65 days expired, the decision as to the amount of benefits became final
and Melkonyan then had 30 days to file his application for EAJA fees. See id.
107. Id.
108. See Appellees Petition for Rehearing at 1, Melkonyan, 878 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir.
1989) (on file at Fordham Law Review); Brief for Appellant at 4-6, Melkonyan, 878 F.2d
1183 (9th Cir. 1989) (on file at Fordham Law Review).
109. See Appellees Response to Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 9, Melkonyan,
878 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1989) (on file at Fordham Law Review).
110. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.902 (1988); see also Ellis v. Heckler, 569 F. Supp. 792, 793
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (claimant's counsel attempted to argue that there could be no final judg-
ment until the amount of benefits was calculated; the court rejected the argument stating
that "the calculation of benefits is a level ... separable and distinct from the [disability
determination]").
111. Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act permits the district court to review "any
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the claimant is disabled. The amount of benefits is not argued and is not
an issue in a claimant's district court action to establish entitlement to
benefits." 2 In fact, before a claimant can contest the amount of benefits
in the district court, he must first exhaust all his administrative
appeals. 113
Under this final judgment approach, if a claimant does contest the
amount of benefits, he may not apply for EAJA fees until all appeals
pertaining to the amount of benefits have been completed or have been
allowed to expire. Thus, the claimant would be forced to choose be-
tween: 1) acquiescing to and accepting a low benefits award so that he
could immediately apply for EAJA fees and avoid the long final judg-
ment delay caused by the appeal process; or 2) contesting what he be-
lieves to be an unfair benefits award, thus foregoing the ability to
immediately apply for attorney's fees for all the previous litigation.
Under such an approach, the Secretary might even be encouraged to
award smaller benefits, in the hope that a claimant would acquiesce and
accept the amount so as to be able to immediately apply for EAJA fees,
rather than contest and receive no benefits and no EAJA fees until all
appeals are completed. Forcing an individual to acquiesce to govern-
ment action because of the economic deterrent of attorney's fees is ex-
actly what Congress intended to prevent by creating and passing
EAJA.1 14 "Providing an award of fees to a prevailing party represents
one way to improve citizen access to courts.... When there is an oppor-
tunity to recover costs [as there is under EAJA], a party does not have to
choose between acquiescing to an unreasonable Government order or to
prevailing to his financial detriment." 1 5 While it could be argued that
the Secretary has an incentive to award smaller benefits without the exist-
ence of EAJA, the presence of EAJA increases the incentive.
Furthermore, this approach creates a problem of notice. Under this
view, a letter from the Social Security Administration advising the claim-
ant of the amount of his benefits constitutes a final judgment. Counsel
for the claimant in Melkonyan submitted affidavits from three attorneys
practicing Social Security law in California, each of whom stated that
such letters are rarely, if ever, sent to a claimant's attorney. 16 This unof-
ficial and awkward procedure creates the potential for an attorney's fail-
final decision of the Secretary." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982). Where the Secretary's final
decision was to deny benefits, the district court's review may extend no further than
determining whether a denial benefit was based on substantial evidence and therefore
appropriate. See id.
112. This is because a calculation of benefits is precluded by the Secretary's finding
that claimant is ineligible for benefits.
113. See R. Francis, supra note 35, § 6:34, at 23.
114. See House Report I, supra note 11, at 4991.
115. Id.
116. See Appellants Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Exhibits A, B & C at 10-13,
Melkonyan v. Heckler, 878 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 87-5716) (on file at Fordham
Law Review).
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ing to meet the EAJA deadline simply because he never received notice
from the Secretary.
By analogy, such an approach is also contrary to the majority of cases
holding that where the district court finds claimant disabled and reverses
the Secretary outright, remanding the case solely for the calculation of
benefits, the critical date is that of the court's reversal and remand, not
the date upon which benefits are eventually calculated.1 17
C. New Ninth Circuit & Wagaman Approaches Best Comport with the
Purpose and Intent of EAJA
The Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan v. Hudson118 eliminated the
distinction, for EAJA purposes, between agency action pursuant to re-
mand and judicial action, and consequently laid the groundwork for
holding that an agency decision on remand may be considered the final
judgement in the action. Prior to this decision, however, a South Dakota
district court in Wagaman v. Bowen 19 held that the disability determina-
tion made by the Secretary on remand constitutes a final judgment under
EAJA. 1 0 Wagaman's reasoning was simple and persuasive: because the
Secretary's decision may not be appealed, it is a final judgment.'21 That
is, if on remand the Secretary issues a decision fully favorable to the
claimant, neither the Secretary nor the claimant may appeal, either
within the Administration or in the courts. 122 Hence, the claimant be-
comes a prevailing party and the decision of the Secretary is final and
unappealable. A final judgment has been entered that starts the tolling of
the thirty-day filing period.
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Wagaman approach in its revised
Melkonyan opinion.12 Recognizing that the Secretary's decision on re-
mand, favorable to a claimant, may not be appealed by either the claim-
ant or the Secretary, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the date of the
Secretary's decision was the date of final judgment. 124 Noting its disap-
proval of the Fourth Circuit's holding in Guthrie, Melkonyan saw no
need to interpret "judgment" as requiring a judgment by a court. 125 In-
stead, the Ninth Circuit felt that the individual would benefit and conse-
quently, EAJA would be better served, if the claimant could seek EAJA
117. See Martindale v. Sullivan, 890 F.2d 410, 412-13 (1lth Cir. 1989); Taylor v.
United States, 749 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1984); Najor v. Secretary of Health & Hum.
Servs., 675 F. Supp. 379, 381 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
118. 109 S. Ct. 2248 (1989).
119. 698 F. Supp. 187 (D.S.D. 1988).
120. See id. at 189-90.
121. See id. at 189.
122. See Melkonyan v. Heckler, 895 F.2d 556, 558 (9th Cir. 1990); Gregory v. Bowen,
No. 88-1208 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allfeds library, Dist file).
123. Melkonyan v. Heckler, 895 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1990).
124. See id. at 558-60.
125. See id. at 559.
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fees as soon as the Secretary's action on remand becomes final.12 6
Unlike the Guthrie approach, which basically allows the Secretary to
hold up final judgment by not filing his new decision with the district
court, the Ninth Circuit's approach in Melkonyan "sets definite limits for
purposes of finality." 127
This view comports with the intent of EAJA to lessen the economic
burden on the individual who must litigate against the government in
order to vindicate his rights.1 2 The approach adopted in Melkonyan and
Wagaman allows a claimant to seek EAJA fees as soon as he becomes a
prevailing party. Once a claimant prevails and an irreversible decision in
his favor has been issued, there is no apparent reason why he should not
be able to seek attorney's fees immediately. An unnecessary delay be-
tween the time the claimant's rights are vindicated and the time he is able
to apply for fees so that he may pay his attorney acts as deterrent to
litigation and ignores the spirit of EAJA.
In addition, considering the Secretary's new decision on remand as the
final judgment for EAJA purposes is in harmony with the widely ac-
cepted practice of considering a district court's decision finding the
claimant disabled and entitled to benefits to be a final judgment.1 29 Most
decisions agree that a district court order reversing the Secretary and
remanding solely for the calculation of the amount of benefits due is a
final judgment once the time to appeal has expired. 130 That is, the claim-
ant is clearly a prevailing party, and once the time to appeal expires, no
other judgment concerning the issue of claimant's disabled status may be
made. 31 Similarly, when the Secretary on remand renders a decision
fully favorable to the claimant finding him disabled, no other judgment
as to claimant's disabled status may be made. 132
A potential argument that could be made in opposition to holding that
the date of the Secretary's decision is a final judgment is that such a
conclusion could cause a fragmentation of fee petitions under EAJA and
section 406(b) of the Social Security Act, when past-due benefits are not
calculated until some time after final judgment. Section 406(b) is the
section of the Social Security Act that permits the district court to award
attorney's fees out of claimant's past-due benefits. 133
126. See id. at 559-60.
127. Id. at 559.
128. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See Melkonyan v. Heckler, 895 F.2d 556, 558 (9th Cir. 1990).
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (1982). Past-due benefits are those benefits that the claim-
ant should have received had his application been properly approved. The court may
only award up to 25% of the past-due benefits as attorney fees. See id. For example,
suppose a claimant applies for disability benefits in January 1985 and his application is
denied. After two years of administrative proceedings, he appeals to the district court.
Six months later, the claimant is finally found to be disabled and entitled to benefits of
$400 per month. He is entitled to the monthly benefits as of the date of his initial applica-
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A fragmentation of fee petitions will not occur, however, because
EAJA and 406(b) applications may be reviewed simultaneously and de-
cided by the district court even prior to the calculation of benefits. 34 In
Watford v. Heckler,135 the amount of past-due benefits had not been cal-
culated at the time the claimant and his attorney submitted fee applica-
tions under both EAJA and 406(b), yet both applications were
considered simultaneously. That is, the court calculated what it believed
was a reasonable fee under 406(b), and then instructed the Secretary to
pay the lesser of that amount or 25 percent of claimant's past-due bene-
fits to the claimant's attorney.13 6 Where EAJA fees are awarded along
with 406(b) fees, the district court can order the Secretary to give both
awards to the claimant's attorney who must then surrender the lesser of
the two awards to the claimant.137 Under such an approach, attorney's
fees are calculated quickly, judicial efficiency is fostered, and the claim-
ant and his attorney are satisfied.
tion: January 1985. Thus, claimant is entitled to 30 months at $400 per month, or
$12,000 in past-due benefits. Of this $12,000, the district court may award up to $3,000
to claimant's attorney as compensation for his services performed in the district court.
The distinction between EAJA and the Social Security Act fees is that EAJA fees are
recovered directly from the government while 406(b) fees are recovered from the claim-
ant. An attorney may apply for fees under both statutes, see R. Francis, supra note 35,
§ 5.34, at 39, but must give the lesser of the two to the claimant. See Wells v. Bowen, 855
F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1988); Kemp v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 966, 967-68 (10th Cir. 1987). The
higher award goes to the attorney. See Wells, 855 F.2d at 42. One fee is not generally
smaller than the other. See, e.g., Hills v. Secretary of Health & Hum. Servs., 726 F.
Supp. 434, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (EAJA award $2,619.00; 406(b) award $3,906.25);
Brown v. Sullivan, 724 F. Supp. 76, 81 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (EAJA award $4,230.00; 406(b)
award $3,960.00); Freedle v. Bowen, 674 F. Supp. 799, 800-02 (D. Nev. 1987) (EAJA
award $2,135.00; 406(b) award $3,935.00). Under section 406(b), the district court may
award up to 25 percent of the claimant's past-due benefits to the claimant's attorney as
attorney fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (1982).
Some courts prefer not to consider a 406(b) application until the amount of past-due
benefits has been calculated by the Secretary. It is not uncommon for the Secretary to
take months from the time of his final decision to compute the amount of benefits. Con-
sequently, while an EAJA petition must be filed within thirty days of the Secretary's
decision on remand, 406(b) applications, according to some courts, must await calcula-
tion of past-due benefits. This creates a fragmentation problem. The solution espoused
by the district court in O'Grady v. Heckler, 629 F. Supp. 1186 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), is to
hold the EAJA petition in abeyance until the past due benefits have been calculated and
consequently the 406(b) application may be considered. Such an approach, delaying con-
sideration of EAJA applications because of section 406(b), is not necessary because a
court may consider and decide a 406(b) application before benefits are calculated, yet
after a final judgment on the merits has been made.
134. See Watford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
3531 (1985).
135. 765 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir.), cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 3531 (1985).
136. See id.; see also Donovan v. Secretary of Health & Hum. Servs., 598 F. Supp. 120,
121-22 (D. Del. 1984) (in event 406(b) award exceeds 25 percent of past-due benefits,
Secretary authorized to reduce 406(b) award to 25 percent).
137. See Lee v. Sullivan, 723 F. Supp. 92, 98 (E.D. Wis. 1989).
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of the Equal Access to Justice Act is to improve access to
courts and to ensure that certain individuals will not be deterred from
defending against or seeking review of unreasonable government action
because of the expense involved. When a disability claimant is found to
be disabled and entitled to benefits by the Secretary on remand, he
should be able to apply immediately for EAJA fees. The Ninth Circuit's
interpretation of final judgment in Melkonyan v. Heckler provides for
immediate fee applications and should be adopted by other jurisdictions
so that a uniform standard may be applied to disabled individuals across
the United States. Under this approach, a prevailing party, in accord-
ance with the spirit of EAJA, would be able to seek attorney's fees as
soon as he prevails and EAJA could fulfill its intended role for Social
Security disability claimants.
Dawn C. Bradshaw

